Revitalising Britain and scrapping the process of ‘Managed Decline’ - Mikolaj Dziak

The United Kingdom faces a challenging international environment. With the ongoing Ukraine War, Middle Eastern instability, and cyber-attacks, it is perhaps the most volatile geopolitical landscape since the end of the Cold war. Despite this, consecutive governments have subjected Britain’s armed forces, and particularly the Royal Navy, to a process dubbed, ‘managed decline.’ This has been paired with a lack of accountability for the money that is actually provided. The most recent Strategic Defence Review (SDR) commented that the MOD must ‘demonstrate it can properly account for its expenditure. It lacked accounting records to support more than £6 billion of its assets in its 2024-25 Annual Report and Accounts.[1] Reversing this decline demands a comprehensive strategy based on rebuilding Britain’s industrial base, restoring the Royal Navy as a force that can adequately meet its overseas tasks, and fundamentally reforming the MOD procurement and spending.

It is not an accident that I am focusing on the Royal Navy (RN), once the greatest maritime power in history and a vital part of British defence. As of March 2026, The RN operates 63 commissioned ships, yet only 25 qualify as genuine fighting vessels such as submarines, aircraft carriers, destroyers and frigates. The remainder are support, patrol and survey vessels. In contrast, France operates about 100 combat vessels, Japan has 70, the US has 290, and China has over 355. What’s worse is that the British fleet is stretched dangerously thin due to its worldwide commitments, including the defence of 15 overseas territories such as the Falkland’s. The mentality held by some is that the quality and training somehow negate this massive shortage. However this is nothing more than nostalgia, detached from current realities. Britain fields four ageing Vanguard-Class ballistic missile submarines that act as Britain’s nuclear deterrent and six Astute-Class submarines. In practice, only one Astute-Class submarine is operational, with the others under extensive maintenance, whilst the Vanguard-Class is outdated. This puts enormous strain on crews and raises questions about gaps in the nuclear deterrent. The surface fleet fare little better. Britain has two Queen-Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers, yet typically only one is fully operational. Out of the six Type-45 destroyers, known for reliability issues, only two are operational.  Only five of the Type-23 frigates are active. This is roughly half the fighting strength the RN possessed in 1996, whilst the commitments have not halved. 

We are already experiencing the consequences of this naval demilitarisation. During the recent tensions with Iran, Britain found itself seemingly unable to dispatch even a single warship to defend Cyprus. In contrast, during the Falklands campaign the RN deployed a taskforce of two aircraft carriers, eight destroyers, and sixteen frigates whilst still being able to meet its other obligations. If the RN struggles to send a single destroyer 3,000 nautical miles to Cyprus, then a 7,000 nautical mile journey to the Falklands seems unrealistic. The naval crisis is only a microcosm for the broader failings of British defence. Spending has been treated as optional as investment in security, economic strength and technological leadership has been cut. Defence industries are not about equipping armed forces, they are often places of high-skilled employment, innovation, technological growth, and huge export revenue.

The 2025 SDR recognised the importance of industrial growth, stating that Britain must establish a 15-year defence industrial development programme that involves long-term certainty. Procurement policy should prioritise British-built equipment where viable. If implemented, numerous jobs would be created throughout the UK, which would help post-industrial cities as well as dealing with unemployment and emigration. Restoring the RN must be the priority, not just due to Britain being an island nation, but also because it would utilise the experience and strengths of British technology and industry. Fleet expansion can only happen if there is an adequate number of sailors and sufficient revenue for upkeep. Destroyer and frigate numbers need to rise to a level that allows continuous global presence and proper carrier escort groups. Amphibious and logistics capabilities must be strengthened to enable credible expeditionary operations.

The aforementioned manpower shortages show another issue plaguing British armed forces. Recently, seven vessels, including Type-23 frigates and amphibious assault ships, have been decommissioned due to manpower shortages. Consequently, competitive pay, expanded recruitment into engineering roles, and retention incentives are essential to attract and keep skilled personnel who otherwise might go abroad or into the private sector. In order to achieve these goals, the MOD must reform its procurement process and fix its current expenditure issues. Successive government have announced ambitious programmes like the Ajax fighting vehicle, only for the programme to face chronic delays, ballooning costs, and weak accountability. The SDR 2026 states that the cost of Dreadnought, which is due to enter service in the early 2030s, currently remains within its £41 billion budget (including a £10 billion contingency). However, published information about other DNE programmes is too vague to allow Parliament to understand and challenge the range of activities they cover, what their costs are, and how these have changed over time.[2] Transparency over costs and scheduling must be in place to reduce the bureaucratic mess that is currently in place.

Britain must learn from its close allies if it wants to adapt. France, as much as we like to complain about them, has a very convincing model of strategic sovereignty. Through long-term investment in French firms like Dassault, Airbus, KNDS, and Naval Group, French industry is able to cover domestic needs while offering a strong and competitive export market.

In conclusion, the current state of the Royal Navy, with more admirals than major operational vessels, would make Admiral Nelson roll in his grave. This makes it imperative for the Conservatives to put an end to the managed decline and austerity that is prevailing in British defence. If Britain can revitalise its defence industry, it will once again be able to offer to its citizens security, employment, and technological progress. The existence of military allies should not enable British complacency, as we saw this backfire in both 1939 and in Cyprus. Investing in defence is not immoral and it is not irresponsible; it is necessary.

[1] https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/53461/documents/298796/default/

[2] https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/53461/documents/298796/default/